

Annex A Review into the role of Police and Crime Commissioners

Part One – Key Research Questions

This following sets out a broad, high-level sense of the areas we want to cover in Part One and is by no means exhaustive. We welcome any suggested additions within the remit of the review's terms of reference.

- 1) **How to reinforce and sharpen the accountability of PCCs to the communities they serve, including how to raise the profile of the PCC model and improve the ease with which the public can access information about their PCC.**
 - i. How effectively do PCCs engage the public?
 - ii. How do we ensure the public can more easily hold their PCC to account at the ballot box, for reducing crime and delivering an effective and efficient police force?
- 2) **How to ensure that PCCs have sufficient resilience in the event that they cannot undertake their role, by considering existing arrangements for appointing Deputies.**
 - i. Is the current model resilient enough to hold up when things go wrong?
- 3) **How to improve the current scrutiny model for PCCs, including the provision of common quality standards and considering the role of Panel chairs.**
 - i. Are the right checks and balances in place to make PCC-led accountability work?
 - ii. Do police and crime panels have the right skills, tools and powers to hold PCCs to account?
 - iii. Should a system of recall be introduced for PCCs, and if so, what should be the trigger mechanism?
- 4) **The effectiveness of the current PCC and Chief Constable oversight dynamic, including consideration of the process for the suspension/dismissal of Chief Constables and reviewing the Policing Protocol.**
 - i. Are PCC powers around the removal and appointment of chief constables correctly calibrated?
 - ii. Is the balance right in the PCC/CC relationship? And what changes might be needed to the Policing Protocol?
- 5) **Whether any steps are needed to strengthen accountability or clarity of roles within the mayoral PCC model, learning from the transfer of PCC and Fire & Rescue Authority (FRA) functions to mayors.** This will lay the foundations for our longer-term ambition to increase the number of mayors with responsibility for public safety, which will be outlined in the forthcoming Local Recovery and Devolution White Paper.
 - i. What do you see as the strategic benefits of having a single, elected and accountable leader, who is responsible for a range of public safety functions?
 - ii. What are the opportunities and issues with transferring PCC and FRA functions to mayors?
 - iii. What are the lessons learned to date from transferring PCC and FRA functions to mayoral models?

6) How we set out our long-term ambition on fire governance reform ahead of the May 2021 PCC elections.

- i. What are the benefits and challenges of the current model for transferring fire governance to PCCs?
- ii. How can we strengthen the accountability and transparency of fire governance?
- iii. How can we strengthen and clarify the distinction between strategic and operational planning in fire?
- iv. Could governance change help maximise collaboration between policing and fire?
- v. What are the benefits of having a range of services and strategic planning under one elected individual?

In helping us prepare for Part Two, we are also interested in understanding if the levers currently available to PCCs are sufficient to allow them to cut crime effectively in their force areas.

The following areas are explicitly out of scope for part-one:

- Wholesale reform of the existing scrutiny model through Police and Crime Panels
- Consideration of PCCs' role in reoffender management and wider justice devolution
- Substantive electoral reform (Cabinet Office lead)

Neither Part one nor Part two of the review will consider a wholly new governance model for policing (mayoral devolution aside) or examine the 43 police force model.